

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 004144

SIPDIS

EUR FOR PDAS BRADTKE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2014

TAGS: [MOPS](#) [MARR](#) [PREL](#) [BK](#) [NATO](#) [EUN](#) [USEU](#) [BRUSSELS](#)

SUBJECT: EUMS THOUGHTS ON REMAINING SFOR HANDOVER ISSUES

REF: STATE 195305

Classified By: Political-Military Officer Jeremy Brenner for reasons 1.
5 (b) and (d)

11. (C) Summary: Some issues related to the end of SFOR and the beginning of Operation Althea remain to be resolved, but planners in HR Solana's secretariat are confident that the transfer will go smoothly. The transfer date has been largely resolved among commanders on the ground, but the EU political decision-making apparatus must still agree to a December 1 date. The designation of DSACEUR as the successor to COMIFOR's final authority under Dayton is a more significant sticking point. EUR PDAS Bradtke raised many of these issues with the PSC Troika September 27. (See Septel.) End summary.

12. (C) Mission polmiloff recently spoke with Didier Lenoir, a defense policy planner on the Military Staff within CFSP High Representative Solana's Secretariat General. We raised the outstanding SFOR handover issues contained in reftel in order to gauge the latest thinking on the Military Staff. We found areas of agreement in principle, and subjects that may require further discussion.

Date of Handover

13. (C) Lenoir reiterated what he has told us previously concerning the date of the Transfer of Authority. The PSC, in its early political discussions of the mission, has been using December 16 as the target date for the TOA. This is an unofficial date, since Operation Althea will only take place following a high-level decision to launch the mission. The date will be set at that time. As a practical matter, the EU planners understand the U.S. requirements regarding the scheduling of withdrawal of its forces, and on the ground, there is a recognition that the U.S. withdrawal will be phased. Lenoir said there are a number of ways to resolve the discrepancy in working dates, but that the resolution must be arrived at in discussions between NATO and the EU, not on a bilateral basis. He said the PSC could opt to adopt an earlier date, the EU and NATO could agree that there would be a two week lapse in coverage in Task Force North, or the Finns could agree to operate under NATO for those two weeks until the TOA. In any event, he did not anticipate any problem in reaching an understanding and observed that on the military side, things will be largely in place by December 1.

SOFA

14. (C) Lenoir had just received a paper from his legal services on the issue of whether or not a new SOFA would be needed for the new mission. The paper was inconclusive, and Lenoir said there remained two schools of thought on the subject within the EU. The first school, headed up by the UK, holds that there is no need -- or desire -- for a new SOFA. The second school argues that under the rubric of increasing Bosnian "ownership" of its own affairs, discussion, and perhaps renegotiation of a SOFA is desirable. Lenoir's conclusion was that the SOFA would be the product of consultations rather than imposition even if its terms remained unchanged.

COMIFOR

15. (C) Lenoir agreed completely on the need for a coordination mechanism to manage potential areas of overlapping or unclear responsibilities between the NATO HQ and EUFOR. He said he has been making precisely such an argument since planning began for the Althea mission. He declined to endorse DSACEUR as the appropriate mechanism, arguing that such an arrangement created the impression that EU forces were somehow being "chopped to NATO." Still, he insisted that there is a need to find a way for NATO to call upon EUFOR for assistance or support if needed. The issue of who will exercise the overarching authority ascribed to COMIFOR is one of the difficult questions that Lenoir said have been "kicked down the road" by EU political decisionmakers.

Reserves

16. (C) The EU planner was adamant that ambiguity in the decision chain for deploying reserves was "no way to plan a military operation." He agreed with the U.S. call for

agreement on the procedures between NATO and the EU, even though difficult discussions might ensue. (Note: Other more senior officials, such as DG Robert Cooper, express comfort with the ambiguity and "parallel decision-making." End Note)

POLAD and UNSCR

[17](#). (C) After conferring with colleagues, Lenoir assured us that Bruce Maclean's nomination as POLAD to NATO HQ in Sarajevo would be welcome. High Representative Ashdown looks forward to working with Maclean again we were told. On the issue of an exchange of letters between NATO and the EU to codify arrangements established by a new UNSCR, Lenoir expressed his personal view that such an exchange would be unnecessary, but if it were needed for political reasons, he saw no disadvantage.

McKinley